Descartes' Solitude Thesis: A Neglected Aspect of the Cartesian Methodology by Trisokkas, Ioannis
153
DESCARTES’ SOLITUDE THESIS:  
A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF THE CARTESIAN 
METHODOLOGY
Abstract
Recent research has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search 
for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an 
epistemic community is limited. This is what one may call the limited informa-
tion thesis. There is, however, the possibility of an even more radical position 
than this: the thesis that any communication between peers has zero epistemic 
value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take 
into consideration the truth-claims of her peers. This can be called the solitude 
thesis. The paper defends the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude 
thesis with respect to metaphysical inquiry. The defense is facilitated by means of 
interpreting textual evidence found in Descartes’ essays Discourse on the Meth-
od, The Search for Truth and the Meditations on First Philosophy.
Keywords: solitude, Descartes, metaphysics, truth, the Other, learning, teaching, 
method
1. The Problem
Recent research in economic theory, social epistemology and 
philosophy of science has defended the surprising thesis that in many 
cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between 
the members of an epistemic community is limited.1 This is what one 
may call the limited information thesis. The thesis is ‘surprising’ because 
the currently dominant view in epistemic communities is that the more 
information about a relevant subject matter one receives from one’s 
peers, the better one’s chances of epistemic success are. As concerns 
the community of scientists in particular, the dominant view is clearly 
manifested in the common practice of scientific journals to demand that 
the authors should take into serious consideration the ideas of their peers 
and ignorance of ‘what is going on in the literature’ is considered a vice.
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Despite their unorthodox position, however, the supporters of the 
limited information thesis do not take the full step of rejecting epistemic 
communication altogether. Some communication between peers is needed 
if the search for truth is to be realized. Taking that full step would make 
one a supporter of what may be called the solitude thesis. This thesis 
states that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value 
and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take 
into serious consideration the ideas of her peers. 
The present paper argues that Descartes is, in at least some of his 
writings, a fervent supporter of a version of the solitude thesis. In particular, 
the claim is that there is significant textual evidence in the Descartes 
corpus that he believed that as concerns metaphysical inquiry the quest 
for truth is better off if the one who produces metaphysical theory does 
not take into serious consideration the ideas of other metaphysicians. By 
the term ‘metaphysics’ Descartes understands the a priori inquiry into the 
fundamental determinations of being, what one may call ‘fundamental 
reality’. The metaphysician who produces metaphysical theory will 
be called metaphysician-projector, so as to distinguish her from the 
metaphysician-receiver, who is the metaphysician who takes into serious 
consideration a metaphysical theory or metaphysical ideas proposed by 
another metaphysician (the Other). Of course, the metaphysician-projector 
can be also metaphysician-receiver; but for the supporter of the solitude 
thesis the metaphysician-projector would be better off epistemically if she 
were not also metaphysician-receiver.  
Descartes’ support for the solitude thesis has never been allowed to 
take central stage in Cartesian scholarship. Such great Descartes scholars 
as Cottingham, Kemp-Smith, Williams, Curley, Gaukroger and Wilson 
emphasize the philosopher’s intellectual struggle to avoid reference to 
authority and reach knowledge undogmatically, but they never emphasize 
(or even mention) that according to Descartes this entails that the inquirer 
into metaphysical truth should never take into serious consideration any 
truth-claims coming from her peers and that she can discover the whole 
metaphysical truth all by herself.2 In fact, despite thorough research on the 
issue, I have not been able to discover even a single article that discusses 
Descartes as a supporter of the solitude thesis.3 This in itself is curious 
enough to justify an investigation into the matter. 
The aim, then, of the paper is to substantiate the claim that Descartes 
is, in at least some of his writings, a supporter of the solitude thesis. The 
injunction ‘in at least some of his writings’ clarifies that the evidence 
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looked for is local, not global. The distinction between local and global 
textual evidence is made with respect to the evidence found in the work 
of an author. Whereas local evidence is the one provided by a part of the 
whole work, global evidence is the one provided by the whole work. The 
local textual evidence for substantiating the claim in question will be found 
in Descartes’ Discourse on the Method (hereafter ‘DM’), The Search for 
Truth (hereafter ‘ST’) and the Meditations on First Philosophy (hereafter 
‘MFP’), all of which cover a period of writing between 1635 and 1641. 
Descartes’ method does not apply only to metaphysical knowledge; 
it is envisioned to pervade also the fields of empirical and mathematical 
knowledge. There is a general methodological structure that repeats itself 
in each of these cognitive fields. Although the question of the identity 
of the method across disciplines is fascinating, what is more important 
for our purposes is the fact that Descartes distinguishes metaphysical 
from empirical and mathematical knowledge. It is quite evident from 
certain passages found in the works we have proposed to investigate that 
Descartes’ scientia has a part that corresponds solely to metaphysics.4 
Even though mathematical and part of empirical knowledge can have 
foundational roles in the system of all knowledge,5 it is metaphysical 
knowledge that is considered the ultimate foundation of such a system.6 
While mathematical and empirical knowledge cannot have validity unless 
being grounded on metaphysical knowledge,7 the latter grounds itself. 
Metaphysics, which Descartes sometimes calls simply ‘philosophy’,8 
has as its subject matter concepts deriving directly from rational thought 
(reason, ratio), such as ‘thought’ and ‘existence’, transcendent objects, 
such as God and the soul and, as ST reveals, universal determinations of 
the fundamental structure of all objects in general (“[the determinations of] 
all the things in the world, considering them as they are in themselves”9), 
such as extension, space and motion. 
The present paper is interested only in substantiating the claim that 
Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to inquiry 
in metaphysics – that he cancels out the epistemic contribution of the 
Other in the context of such an inquiry. Of course, the question whether 
his support of the solitude thesis stretches to cover also the fields of 
empirical and mathematical knowledge is vastly important: what exactly 
is, according to Descartes, the epistemic role of the Other in an inquiry 
in mathematics or physical science? Despite its significance, the question 
will not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that there are two 
passages in DM where Descartes undoubtedly denies the truth of the 
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solitude thesis regarding that part of scientia which requires elaborate 
empirical observation and conduct of experiments.10 
2. Discourse on the Method
Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, first published in 1637, but being 
written over the winter of 1635-36, contains one of the most powerful 
expositions of the solitude thesis in the history of philosophy. DM functions 
as an introduction to the Cartesian system of all knowledge and aims at 
specifying the basic, most general attributes of the proposed method. As 
already pointed out, the method has a general core that runs through 
all cognitive disciplines, but has also features that are peculiar to each 
discipline. In this section we will discuss Descartes’ presentation of his 
method in DM insofar as it applies to metaphysical knowledge.
The basis of his argument is the belief that the discovery of metaphysical 
truth, as well as of any other truth,11 is purely a matter of method – it is 
not a matter of ‘special powers’ possessed by certain individuals. Each 
and every metaphysician is able to disclose metaphysical truth as long 
as she or he follows the right method,12 since “reason [...] exists whole 
and complete in each of us.”13 Descartes, then, is anxious to establish 
from the outset an ‘equality’ among the members of the community of 
metaphysicians: they all have the same and an equal amount of cognitive 
power (reason) and what will distinguish the one from the other is whether 
or not one follows the right method. 
Descartes next moves on to comment on the speed of metaphysical 
inquiry; as he puts it, “those who proceed but very slowly can make much 
greater progress [...] than those who hurry [...].”14 It is evident from the 
context that the progress he is referring to is ‘progress in knowledge’, i.e. 
epistemic progress. He also mentions that it is essential requirement for 
succeeding in acquiring “knowledge of truth”15 that the metaphysician 
“increase[s] [his] knowledge gradually and raise[s] it little by little to the 
highest point.”16 These two epistemic attributes, slow pace and gradual 
development, play a key role in the arguments of the supporters of the 
limited information thesis. Kevin Zollman, for example, has argued that 
a truth-inquirer who proceeds with slow pace and develops her inquiry 
gradually has higher positive probability to achieve epistemic success if the 
information she receives from her peers is decreased than if this information 
is increased.17 This is why Zollman advises not only that truth-inquirers 
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must be given sufficiently long time to work on their projects, but also 
that “when we want accuracy [i.e. the truth] above all else, we should 
prefer [epistemic] communities made up of more isolated individuals.”18 
The crucial question, for us, is this: Does Descartes hold a similar view 
with respect to metaphysical inquiry? 
In order to answer this question we must turn our attention to an 
attribute of the Cartesian method that is peculiar to metaphysical inquiry. 
This, together with ‘the Cogito’, is the attribute Descartes’ metaphysical 
part of scientia is most famous for: the quest for metaphysical truth should 
begin with the act of leaving aside – that is to say, the act of no longer taking 
into serious consideration – any metaphysical truth-claim whatsoever. The 
reason for this, Descartes explains in a Pyrrhonian fashion,19 is that there 
was not even a single idea he received from other metaphysicians which 
was not a matter of dispute.20 All the process of receiving metaphysical 
ideas has offered him hitherto is that he “came to think [that he] had gained 
nothing from [his] attempts to become educated but increasing recognition 
of [his] ignorance”21 and that “there was no knowledge in the world such 
as [he] had previously been led to hope for.”22 Due to this ‘universal 
doubt’, Cartesian metaphysics begins with a retreat to the solitary self – 
this is not a self who is unable to communicate with others (solipsism), a 
brain-in-a-vat, but rather a self that chooses to isolate herself in order to 
increase her chances of epistemic success in the realm of metaphysics. 
The isolation of the self has here the specific meaning of an act of (a) 
removing the value of truth from each and every truth-claim contained 
in the metaphysician’s mind and (b) terminating the influx of truth-claims 
proposed by other metaphysicians into that mind. Thus, to the question we 
raised earlier the following preliminary response must be given: Descartes 
takes a much more radical stance than Zollman concerning the connection 
between slow pace and gradual development, on the one hand, and the 
transmission of information between peers, on the other, for he maintains 
that such a slow pace and gradual development must begin from a state 
of affairs in which all receptivity of information has vanished (whereas 
Zollman demands only that the received information be limited). 
Nevertheless, this does not yet entail that metaphysical practice23 
will be forever shut to information coming from other metaphysicians – 
hence the preliminary character of the response above. Indeed, there is 
still the possibility that it begins from a non-receptive state of affairs and 
then reaches a stage at which the reception of truth-claims from other 
metaphysicians is allowed to be reintroduced. As noted, Descartes’ idea 
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of empirical inquiry (namely that inquiry which is based upon empirical 
observations and experiments) seems to permit an empirical scientist’s 
receiving ideas from other empirical scientists. Metaphysics provides the 
ultimate ground of the sciences,24 but there where metaphysics ends the 
empirical scientist is allowed to start communicating with her peers and 
taking into serious consideration their ideas and empirical findings.25 
But what holds for the empirical part of scientia does not hold for 
its metaphysical part. The metaphysician-projector should develop 
her metaphysical theory from beginning to end without at any stage 
incorporating truth-claims from other metaphysicians. For Descartes, 
not only the beginning, but also the development and completion of the 
metaphysical theory must take place in a context of absolute epistemic 
solitude (in the specific sense of one’s not taking into serious consideration 
the truth-claims of other metaphysicians). He writes that the metaphysician 
must “direct his thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the 
simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascend little by little, 
step by step, to knowledge of the most complex [...].”26 This ‘orderly’ 
construction denotes a necessary interconnection between each stage 
in the development and the one that follows it,27 as it happens in “those 
long chains” of geometrical reasoning.28 For Descartes, the necessity of a 
metaphysical content has its ground on the fact that its generation is owed 
solely to the metaphysician-projector’s ‘clear and distinct’ reflection upon 
the metaphysical content that precedes it.29 Like Hegel, Descartes believed 
that all metaphysical content must emerge in an orderly fashion from the 
thinking of the solitary self.30 In the remainder of the present section I provide 
textual evidence in support of this particular claim (the claim, namely, that 
the Other makes absolutely no contribution to metaphysical inquiry). 
On what grounds does Descartes maintain that the metaphysician-
projector is able to generate a complete and true metaphysical content 
based solely upon her own thoughts, without receiving any information 
from other metaphysicians? The justification of this claim rests upon three 
fundamental beliefs: first, that in principle each and every metaphysician’s 
mind contains the same complete rational powers as any other;31 second, 
that the whole truth about a ‘rational’ subject matter is fixed and expressible 
(as Descartes puts it, “since there is only one truth concerning any [rational] 
subject-matter, whoever discovers this truth knows as much about it as 
can be known”32); and third that the orderly, systematic application of 
complete rational powers upon a ‘rational’ subject matter can disclose 
the whole truth about that subject matter. 
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The systematic significance of epistemic solitude for the Cartesian 
system of metaphysical knowledge explains Descartes’ immensely strong 
language when he describes the beginnings of his own metaphysical 
practice. He informs us that he broke free “from the control of [his] 
teachers” and “entirely abandoned the study of letters.”33 Recalling his 
thoughts before he began his metaphysical quest, he tells us that he 
resolved “to seek no knowledge other than that which could be found 
in [himself] or else in the great book of the world;”34 given what he has 
already told us, it should not surprise us that he does not here refer to any 
‘knowledge found in or received from others’. He emphatically stresses that 
the revolution in his thinking came when he isolated himself in “quarters 
where, finding no conversation to divert [him] [...], [he] stayed all day 
shut up alone in a stove-heated room, where [he] was completely free to 
converse with [himself] about [his] own thoughts.”35 And when he refers 
to the moment when he finally decides to write down his metaphysics, 
he stresses his “resolve to move away from any place where [he] might 
have acquaintances [...] [and] lead a life as solitary and withdrawn as if 
[he] were in the most remote desert.”36 I think it cannot be denied that 
the significance of solitude, of the absence of communication with other 
metaphysicians could not be conveyed more emphatically. 
But maybe one would object at this juncture that the autobiographical 
character of the above extracts does not permit their function as theoretical 
support for the solitude thesis. This, of course, is true, but given that 
they describe the conditions under which Descartes began formulating 
a theory he himself believed to be epistemically successful, they most 
certainly give out his hostile sentiments about the epistemic value of the 
communication with other metaphysicians. Additionally, they help the 
reader vouch for the solitude thesis when they are combined with the 
purely theoretical remarks that follow, most of which specify reasons why 
allowing the ideas of others to influence you is epistemically harmful in 
the domain of metaphysics. 
To begin with, consider the following remark:
[...] There is not [...] so much perfection in works composed of several parts 
and produced by various different craftsmen as in the works of one man.37
This passage expresses the view that (a) the involvement of more than 
one person (or, if you will, the involvement of the ideas of others) in the 
creation of a work and/or (b) mixing up various external elements to create 
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a work reduces the amount of perfection one could find in it. Descartes 
supports this view by reference to various paradigmatic examples, some 
of which are particularly interesting: He tells us that “buildings undertaken 
by a single architect are usually more attractive and better planned than 
those which several have tried to patch up by adapting old walls built 
for different purposes;”38 that “ancient cities which have gradually grown 
from mere villages into large towns are usually ill-proportioned, compared 
with those orderly towns which planners lay out as they fancy on level 
ground;”39 and that “if Sparta was at one time very flourishing, this was 
not because each of its laws in particular was good [...], but because they 
were devised by a single man and hence all tended to the same end.”40 All 
these examples show, according to Descartes, “how difficult it is to make 
something perfect by working [...] on what others have produced.”41 He 
then carries the analogy from ‘craftsmanship’ to metaphysical practice, 
providing thereby justification for the solitude thesis:
[...] Since the [metaphysical] science contained in books [...] is compounded 
and amassed little by little from the opinions of many different persons, it 
never comes so close to the truth as the simple reasoning which a man of 
good sense naturally makes [...].42
He repeats a similar view a few lines farther:
[...] A majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are at all difficult 
to discover [such as the metaphysical truths]; for a single man is much 
more likely to hit upon them than a group of people.43
The general idea here is that allowing the ideas of other metaphysicians 
to influence the construction of a metaphysical theory decreases the 
perfection of that theory: this can only mean that it decreases its chances 
of epistemic success. Descartes is quite explicit: a metaphysical theory 
that takes into serious consideration the ideas of others “never comes so 
close to the truth” as the metaphysical theory that develops properly from 
the thought of a single metaphysician (and the ‘proper’ character of the 
method entails, as the examples make quite clear, that the metaphysician 
begins from a single idea, not from a multiplicity of ideas). The involvement 
of the ideas of others has a distorting or disorienting function, as it takes 
metaphysical thought out of its course by bringing into it a variety of ends 
and a plethora of unnecessary complications and difficulties. This variety of 
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ends and complications do not spring from the same source and, therefore, 
do not have that unity that is so essential for developing an epistemically 
successful metaphysical theory. Thus, the solitude of the inquirer is 
preferable because it increases the perfection of the constructed theory, 
unifies it into a single purpose, and reduces the amount of unnecessary 
and irrelevant complications in it. 
Descartes ends his supportive remarks on the solitude thesis in DM 
by considering the objection that the debates among metaphysicians 
help the metaphysician-projector sharpen the details of her position and 
correct her mistakes:
It may be claimed that such controversies [between peers] would be useful. 
Not only would they make me aware of my mistakes, but also they would 
enable others to have a better understanding of anything worthwhile that 
I may have discovered; and, as many people are able to see more than 
one alone, so these others might begin to make use of my discoveries and 
help me with theirs.44
This is an objection most contemporary philosophers would be sympathetic 
to; in fact, I would insist that it comprises the essence of our modern 
conception of scientific practice. Surely, they would argue, engaging in 
dialogue with our peers would make us aware of our mistakes and help 
us and others understand our theory in a better way. The development of 
a theory, the search for truth, requires group effort (i.e. the involvement 
of the ideas of many) in order to lead to epistemic success.
It is, though, more than evident from what Descartes has already told 
us and from what follows the above cited extract that the thesis that “many 
people are able to see more than one alone” may be a thesis espoused 
by his contemporaries but certainly not by Descartes himself (at least as 
regards metaphysical practice).45 Indeed, in what follows the passage 
Descartes expresses his belief that the communication with others has 
absolutely no epistemic value in the domain of metaphysics:
[...] My acquaintance with the objections that may be raised prevents me 
from expecting any benefit from them. For I have already had frequent 
experience of the judgments [of others]. But it has rarely happened that an 
objection has been raised which I had not wholly foreseen, except when it 
was quite wide of the mark. Thus I have almost never encountered a critic 
of my views who did not seem to be either less rigorous or less impartial 
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than myself. Nor have I ever observed that any previously unknown truth 
has been discovered by means of the disputations practiced in the schools.46
Any objection raised by other metaphysicians, any ‘critical’ observation 
made by them does not offer anything substantial to the search for truth, 
so Descartes, as long as, of course, the inquirer follows the right method. 
Any contribution by the Other is, we would say, superfluous, since the 
Cartesian metaphysician can reach and express metaphysical truth all 
by herself. Moreover, it is not only that the communication with others 
is of no help with the search for metaphysical truth – it is also that it is 
disruptive of and harmful to this search:
[...] As for the observations that others have already made, even if they are 
willing to communicate them to [the metaphysician-projector] [...], they are 
for the most part bound up with so many details or superfluous ingredients 
that it would be very hard for him to make out the truth in them.47
And he concludes with the following two astonishing passages, a crystal-
clear affirmation of the solitude thesis:
I think I can say without vanity that if anyone is capable of making [...] 
additions [to my metaphysics] it must be myself rather than someone 
else – not that there may not be many minds in the world incomparably 
better than mine, but because no one can conceive something so well, 
and make it his own, when he learns it from someone else as when he 
discovers it himself. This is especially true in the case under consideration 
[i.e. metaphysics].48               
In short, if there was ever a task which could not be accomplished so well 
by someone other than the person who began it, it is the one on which I 
am working [i.e. metaphysics].49
Given the above discussion and cited passages, I think the reader 
would find it extremely difficult not to agree that DM offers undisputed 
textual evidence for the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude 
thesis. He certainly holds that the community of metaphysicians is better 
off epistemically if a metaphysician who produces metaphysical theory (a 
metaphysician-projector) does not take into serious consideration the ideas 
of other metaphysicians. The reasons for this are not discussed in much 
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detail in DM and have a rather simplistic form, but are nevertheless stated 
quite explicitly: Descartes believes that the reception of ideas from other 
metaphysicians is both harmful and superfluous to the metaphysician-
projector’s effort to produce an epistemically successful metaphysical 
theory. It is harmful because it distorts and disorients the development of 
the metaphysical theory, it destroys its unity and simplicity; it is superfluous 
because the proper application of the right method enables the solitary self 
to generate a complete and true metaphysical theory. These may not be 
compelling reasons for the truth of the solitude thesis; the present essay, 
however, is not concerned with this issue – it is concerned only with the 
truth of the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis.
3. The Search for Truth
DM is not the only work of Descartes in which we find explicit support 
for the solitude thesis. In The Search for Truth, an incomplete essay in a 
dialogue form published posthumously, but being written most probably in 
1641, Descartes not only confirms what he wrote in DM, but also provides 
important new material in support of the solitude thesis. The protagonists 
are Epistemon, Polyander and Eudoxus – the latter is the mouthpiece for 
Descartes’ own views.50 
The essay has a short introduction, in which Descartes gives out hints 
for his support of the solitude thesis. He begins with a theme familiar from 
DM – he claims that “a good man is not required to have read every book 
or diligently mastered everything in the Schools;”51 in fact, he continues, 
“it would be a kind of defect in his education if he had spent too much 
time on book-learning.”52 The use of one’s reason suffices for one being 
a ‘good man’.53 Although Descartes here refers specifically to the subject 
of practical, not theoretical, reason, it soon becomes clear that what he 
says about the ‘good man’ holds (even more) for the metaphysician (the 
inquirer into metaphysical truth) as well: the use of one’s reason suffices for 
acquiring complete knowledge of metaphysical truth. It is thus important to 
keep in mind that for Descartes the value of learning, the value of reading 
and studying the works of others is limited to learning certain concepts’ 
meaning, the clarification in the receiver’s mind of what the various words 
and linguistic symbols mean. Learning (to wit, receiving ideas from others) 
does not have the epistemic significance of the learner’s receiving true 
propositions. Only one’s own reason (what Descartes calls ‘the natural 
light’54) can determine the truth-value of truth-claims. 
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Even this kind of learning from others (learning the meaning of certain 
concepts) is underplayed by Descartes. He later notes that the inquirer 
can arrive at the truth only if she knows the meaning of such terms 
as ‘existence’, ‘doubt’ and ‘thought’.55  Nevertheless, neither is this a 
knowledge we gain exclusively from our peers nor need we follow any 
‘scientific’ method in order to arrive at it.56 As metaphysical truth can be 
fully expressed by using terms that have everyday use, any ‘moderate 
intelligence’ has already known the meaning of all the required terms 
(but not the truth of the propositions that contain them). If one tries to 
define these terms ‘scientifically’ (to wit, in terms of ‘the Porphyry tree’), 
one will make them obscure and thereby unusable.57 The terms used in 
a complete and true metaphysical theory “are very simple and clear” and 
because of that “they are perceived and known just on their own, and 
there is no better way of knowing and perceiving them.”58  
In the second paragraph of the introduction Descartes is even more 
explicit in his support of the solitude thesis:
I shall bring to light the true riches of the soul, opening up to each of us 
the means whereby we can find within ourselves, without any help from 
anyone else, all the knowledge we may need for the conduct of life, and 
the means of using it in order to acquire all the most abstruse items of 
knowledge that human reason is capable of possessing.59
Two things should be noted here. First, Descartes moves beyond the 
context of ethics and refers to metaphysical inquiry: He tells us that the 
essay we are discussing will clarify not only the search for acquiring “the 
knowledge we may need for the conduct of life,” but also the search for 
acquiring “all the most abstruse items of knowledge that human reason is 
capable of possessing.” The latter phrase undoubtedly signifies the contents 
of metaphysics. Second, Descartes could not really be more straightforward 
about the value of the reception of others’ truth-claims in both of these 
inquiries: Each of us, if she follows the right method,60 can find within 
herself the truth without any help from anyone else. This demand for 
solitude, then, holds not only for the discovery of how to be a ‘good man’ 
but also for the discovery of fundamental reality (metaphysical truth).
If you recall, in DM Descartes referred to the necessary interconnection 
between items of metaphysical knowledge as a reason why the ideas of 
others are superfluous in the process of metaphysical inquiry. Since each 
of us is in principle fully equipped with rational powers, the application 
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of the right method will inevitably lead the inquirer to metaphysical 
truth. But this is itself possible precisely because the elements that are 
known, the fundamental constituents of reality, are interconnected “by a 
marvelous bond.”61 In the third paragraph of the introduction Descartes 
repeats this idea:
[...] I must tell you that what I am undertaking is not so difficult as one might 
imagine. For the items of knowledge that lie within reach of the human 
mind are all linked together by a bond so marvelous, and can be derived 
from each other by means of inferences so necessary, that their discovery 
does not require much skill or intelligence – provided we begin with the 
simplest and know how to move stage by stage to the most sublime.62 
Beginning with the simplest, then, and applying the right (Cartesian) 
method should lead the inquirer to the acquisition of metaphysical truth, 
precisely because the “items of knowledge,” the elements that become 
known through this method are in themselves inferentially linked. So, 
Descartes’ statement that the success of metaphysical inquiry is not owed 
to one’s ‘special’ intelligence or skills should not come as a surprise, even 
though it does conflict with our contemporary view of inquiry in general: 
If the elements of fundamental reality are inferentially interconnected and 
if the proper application of the rational powers that in principle each of us 
has can indeed disclose the full scope of this interconnected reality, then 
each and every metaphysician (namely each and every human being that 
is interested in having knowledge of fundamental reality) should be able 
to discover metaphysical truth. A certain modesty, humbleness and anti-
elitism, then, underlies the Cartesian conception of metaphysical inquiry 
and Descartes himself appears as a true precursor of the Enlightenment. At 
the same time, however, this conception goes against our bedrock belief 
that all inquiry is collective inquiry.
It is in this context that we should understand Descartes’ relation to 
his readers. He is not teaching metaphysical truth to them; they are not 
learning the truth from him. He is only describing what he has come to 
know through the application of the right method and each of his readers 
must reapply this method in the domain of his or her own case.63 Even 
the fact that he has come to know the right method does not mean that 
he is more intelligent than any of his peers, that he has greater rational 
powers and skills: Indeed, he was the one who discovered this method 
and not the others, simply because he “accidentally stumbled upon [it].”64 
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In DM Descartes observed that the (standard) procedure65 of collecting 
the insights of various researchers in numerous massive volumes does 
not have cognitive value and should not be considered an essential part 
of metaphysical inquiry. He repeats the same here. This procedure, he 
tells us, is a risky one, as the result cannot be but a “mingle” of truths 
and falsehoods “scattered haphazardly through such a pile of massive 
tomes.”66 We are expected, Descartes continues, to navigate our way 
to knowledge by “picking out” the truths from such massive collections 
of ‘collective’ inquiry.67 But, he immediately adds, this is a nonsensical 
thing to do, since, at least in the domain of metaphysics, we can discover 
the whole truth purely on our own. This, in fact, would be much more 
economical in terms of time spent and intelligence exercised, as well as 
more effective in terms of actually acquiring “knowledge of truth.” The 
solitary search for truth offers both a more effective and “an easier path.”68 
It is this persistent belief in the superiority of epistemic solitude that allows 
him to express a statement that does not ring well to our contemporary 
ears: “I do not wish to consider what others have known or not known.”69 
I have now established that in the introduction to ST Descartes takes a 
strong stance in favour of the solitude thesis. This support continues in the 
dialogue that follows. In fact, the dialogue begins with the exact theme of 
the epistemic value of learning from others. Polyander, who “has never 
studied at all”70 because his parents believed that “the pursuit of learning 
enfeebles the spirit,”71 is presented as someone who is eager to receive 
knowledge from Epistemon (and later from Eudoxus as well), who “has a 
detailed knowledge of everything that can be learned in the Schools.”72 
Eudoxus, by contrast, who is “a man of moderate intellect but possessing 
a judgment which is not corrupted by any false beliefs and a reason 
which retains all the purity of its nature,”73 enters the scene disagreeing 
with his interlocutors about the value of learning from others: he believes 
that an “orderly soul” can discover “enough truth” from within herself “to 
satisfy amply [her] curiosity [for knowledge]”74 and that in fact he himself 
“no longer feel[s] any passion to learn anything at all” because he is 
“happy with what little knowledge [he has].”75 This “little” but “enough” 
“knowledge of truth” brings Eudoxus to the point of enjoying “the same 
tranquility as would a king if his country were [...] isolated and cut off 
from others.”76 He himself, in fact, has acquired his knowledge when he 
“retire[d] to [a] remote place.”77 Eudoxus, then, is a clear example of a 
supporter of the solitude thesis.    
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Epistemon takes up Eudoxus challenge and points out to him what 
he considers an indisputable fact – that “there are so many things to be 
known” and that no one can believe “that anyone ever knows so much 
that he cannot have good reasons to desire to know more.”78 As it becomes 
apparent later, Eudoxus takes Epistemon’s response to imply that the 
process of knowledge-acquisition must involve the other inquirers as well 
because the amount of possible knowledge available to one is so huge 
that it is simply impossible for a human being, who is finite with regards 
both to her life span and her intellect, to arrive at it solely on her own. 
Eudoxus “readily grants that one man could not live long enough to acquire 
first-hand experience of everything in the world,”79 and that therefore in 
this respect the discoveries of others should be allowed to play a role 
in this ‘never-ending’ process of learning. But he immediately adds that 
the knowledge he was referring to is not one which rests on experience 
(which indeed never stops providing us with new data), knowledge of “all 
the marvels of nature,”80 but rather one founded purely on the rational 
powers of a ‘moderate intelligence’, as these are applied to “the ordinary 
facts” of reason.81 Such knowledge exists both in the realm of ethics and in 
the realm of metaphysics (Polyander refers to such propositions “as those 
concerning the deity, the rational soul, the virtues and their rewards, etc.”82 
but Eudoxus adds that it is “about all the things in the world, considering 
them as they are in themselves”),83 is finite in scope and thereby learnable 
within a life span, and provides the foundation for the possibility of ethical 
and scientific inquiry in general.84    
In the remainder of the essay Eudoxus/Descartes proceeds to flesh out 
his philosophical program in the terms specified. It is a familiar one: it is 
quite the same as the one carried out in the Meditations on First Philosophy 
and Part I of the Principles of Philosophy. As the execution of this program 
will be the focus of the next section, let us brush it aside for the moment. 
What is important to note at this point is that throughout the whole 
discussion of the program in ST Descartes reminds us again and again of 
his support for the solitude thesis – his belief, that is, that the success of 
the inquiry does not require the involvement of the ideas of others, that 
the exchange of information with one’s peers has zero epistemic value. 
He tells us, for example, that his method is one “which enables 
someone of average intelligence to discover for himself everything that 
the most subtle minds can devise”85 and that “a man with a good mind, 
even one brought up in a desert and never illuminated by any light but 
the light of nature [i.e. reason], could not have opinions different from 
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[the one that follows the right method].”86 This last extract is an obvious 
affirmation of the solitude thesis: a man brought up in a “desert” (a symbol 
of isolation, solitude, remoteness), without receiving information from 
other metaphysicians, can acquire complete knowledge of metaphysical 
truth. Even when Epistemon tries very hard to make Eudoxus admit the 
epistemic value of one’s peers, the latter will have none of it. When the 
former describes the intellect as “an excellent painter who is called upon 
to put the finishing touches to a bad picture” painted by others,87 Eudoxus 
immediately objects: 
[...] It seems to me that your painter would do far better to make a fresh 
start on the picture; rather than wasting time in correcting all the lines he 
finds on the canvas, he should wipe them off with a sponge.88
Descartes here repeats what he so powerfully expressed in DM, that the 
discovery of metaphysical truth requires absolutely no epistemic input 
from others. All metaphysical truth-claims contained in the mind of the 
metaphysician-projector must be ‘wiped off with a sponge’ at the beginning 
of her inquiry: the discovery of metaphysical truth requires a fresh start 
and a solitary (one is tempted to say ‘hermetic’) road.
That the establishment of the significance of the metaphysician-
projector’s epistemic solitude is the real goal of the essay becomes 
especially apparent when it increasingly acquires a Meno-like character. 
As in Plato’s Meno, where an uneducated slave-boy arrives at sophisticated 
mathematical knowledge (allegedly) all by himself,89 so here Eudoxus 
aspires to show Epistemon that Polyander, a simple, uneducated man, with 
no knowledge of philosophy or science, can arrive at proven knowledge of 
the fundamental structure of reality (metaphysical truth) all by himself, with 
absolutely no epistemic help from others. Eudoxus wraps the essence of 
the Cartesian attitude to metaphysical inquiry up when he tells Polyander 
that “all I need do [...] is to leave you to get on with the job on your own, 
after taking care to set you [methodologically] on your course. [...] All we 
need for discovering the truth on the most difficult issues [i.e. metaphysical 
issues] is, I think, common sense [i.e. the rational powers of a ‘moderate’ 
intelligence].”90 Indeed, Eudoxus projects the (unknown to us) ending of 
the essay by telling us that Polyander will “suddenly and effortlessly end up 
a learned man” all by himself and without ever “studying or delving into 
the works of the philosophers.”91 And the theoretical conclusion from this 
‘performance’ is that “when this light [of reason] operates on its own, it is 
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less liable to go wrong than when it anxiously strives to follow the numerous 
different rules, the inventions of human ingenuity and idleness, which serve 
more to corrupt it than render it perfect.”92 The expression “the inventions 
of human ingenuity and idleness” signifies nothing but the truth-claims of 
others; thus, the inquirer into metaphysical truth is better off without them, 
as their involvement ‘corrupts’ rather than ‘perfects’ her inquiry.
4. Meditations on First Philosophy
The two texts we have examined have provided us with affirmative 
evidence that Descartes is, in at least some of his writings, a supporter 
of the solitude thesis. Why, then, is there a need to consider a third 
text? This is so because the objection may be raised that what Descartes 
declares in theory fails to be materialized in the actual construction of his 
metaphysics. The claim, that is, is that even though Descartes believes that 
his metaphysical thought is independent of the ideas of others, his actual 
metaphysical inquiry shows signs of dependence. In order to respond to 
this objection one must take a close look at one of Descartes metaphysical 
works, these being the Meditations on First Philosophy (published in 1641) 
and the Principles of Philosophy (published in 1644). In this paper we 
focus (sketchily) on the first text, which is temporally more adjacent to 
the texts we have already examined than the second.
Firstly, it should be noted that the very beginning of Descartes’ 
construction of his metaphysics – the very first ‘meditation’ – functions 
as an affirmation of the solitude thesis. He emphatically argues for the 
epistemic need to “demolish everything completely”93 and thereby 
place himself in a situation of ‘being alone’.94 This ‘loneliness’ denotes 
the epistemic distanciation from both all beliefs and those who express 
them. What remains from this act of epistemic isolation is the pure I; the 
Other has vanished.  
Secondly, the knowledge that initially emerges from the affirmation of 
the doubting I (the cogito) is not the result of an affection from the outside, 
precisely because the external world (including one’s own body) is still in 
doubt. The determination of the I as a thinking thing and the proof of the 
existence and nature of God are the result of a priori deliberations. But 
the same holds for the fundamental universal determinations of all objects 
in general, such as ‘existing’, ‘being something’, ‘being extended’, ‘being 
temporal’, ‘being a substance’, ‘having modes’, etc.95, which impose their 
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necessity on the intellect of the inquirer.96 It is made clear, then, that, 
for Descartes, metaphysical inquiry is intimately connected to epistemic 
solitude, in the sense that metaphysical knowledge progresses from the 
standpoint of the epistemically isolated I. 
Thirdly, and more importantly, Descartes makes reference neither to 
the Other as a subject that epistemically influences the I nor to the Other 
as a peer of him (Descartes). It is evident that Descartes does not simply 
neglect or ignore the presence of the Other in his metaphysical inquiry; 
he rather deliberately refrains from giving the Other any role to play in 
the construction of his metaphysics. Whenever a difficulty appears in the 
rational deduction of the fundamental determinations, Descartes does 
not look for an idea coming from one of his peers, but rather looks back 
into his own mind (“I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself 
more deeply”97) and concentrates even more carefully than before (“if 
one concentrates carefully, all this is quite evident by the natural light”98). 
Fourthly, it is not only that Descartes does not refer to the Other; it is 
also that, judged from a neutral standpoint, the Other makes absolutely no 
epistemic contribution to the argument of MFP. This holds for the Other 
conceived both as an epistemic subject and as a peer of Descartes. The latter 
develops an argument following faithfully the directives of DM and ST: the 
language he uses is simple and unsophisticated and every argumentative step 
follows directly from the one that precedes it. Nothing of what Descartes 
writes requires previous knowledge of any other philosopher in order to 
be fully understood.99 Even the criterion he employs in order to establish 
the truth of metaphysical knowledge, namely clear and distinct perception 
(the ‘natural light’), is evidently conceived in solely personal terms: a 
metaphysical idea is true if, and only if, it is perceived clearly and distinctly 
by the truth-inquirer, not by a community of truth-inquirers: “whatever I 
perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.”100 The I, with which the search 
for metaphysical truth began, never becomes a We. Given these features of 
Cartesian metaphysical inquiry, features that promote its absolute autonomy, 
one is intrigued to ask whether the Other could offer anything to such an 
inquiry. The answer seems to be a negative one.            
5. Conclusion
The present essay has defended the claim that Descartes is a supporter 
of the solitude thesis. It has done so by providing and interpreting local 
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textual evidence in favour of the claim, taken from the Discourse on the 
Method, The Search for Truth and the Meditations on First Philosophy. 
Given that the presence of the solitude thesis in the Descartes corpus is not 
even acknowledged in Descartes scholarship, presenting and interpreting 
textual evidence in its favour is the first thing one should do. The solitude 
thesis is an extreme methodological position. It does not assert simply that 
the inquirer into metaphysical truth must be ‘critical’ of the truth-claims of 
her peers or that she must judge any such claim with her own ‘reason’; it 
rather asserts much more radically (and, judging with our contemporary 
standards, counter-intuitively) that the metaphysician-projector should 
never take into serious consideration any of the truth-claims proposed 
by other metaphysicians. 
Descartes’ ground for so shockingly rejecting the epistemic value of 
the contributions of others in metaphysics is twofold. On the one hand, 
such contributions harm metaphysical inquiry by hindering the fulfilment 
of its task, the acquisition of metaphysical truth. This occurs because the 
epistemic reception of the others’ truth-claims destroys the unity of the 
inquiry by incorporating a plethora of disparate (and often conflicting) 
ends and concepts into it. This has the immediate consequence that the 
inquirer (or a community of inquirers) literally loses herself in a forest of 
myriad conceptual distinctions and spends her whole life trying to find a 
way out – usually by patching some ideas up and dogmatically rejecting 
or accepting others. This, of course, reminds us of the situation which 
more often than not contemporary epistemic communities (in particular 
scientific and philosophical communities) find themselves in.    
On the other hand, the reception of the ideas of others in metaphysics 
must be rejected because it is superfluous. Descartes insists again and 
again that an inquirer of ‘moderate intelligence’ can acquire complete 
knowledge of metaphysical truth all by herself (thus understanding this to 
be no “divine prerogative”101), as long as she follows the right method. This 
is possible because such knowledge has a finite interconnected structure 
that the ‘rational powers’ of even a non-learned man such as Polyander 
can inferentially discover. There is, of course, possible knowledge beyond 
the fundamental structure of reality, knowledge that is endless and 
contingent. One is obliged to listen to what the others have to say in such 
a case of possible knowledge (the knowledge of the empirical sciences). 
But as concerns metaphysical knowledge, knowledge of the fundamental 
structure of all things, a solitary road suffices (and is recommended) for 
“knowing everything in the universe.”102 
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The only value Descartes ascribes to the ideas of others in the field of 
metaphysics is that they can illuminate the meaning of some of the terms 
used in metaphysical inquiry (especially those with which the inquiry 
begins), they can help the inquirer understand better what some concepts 
mean. But this is no privilege of one’s peers – in fact, Descartes seems 
to believe that it is the everyday environment that initially generates and 
elucidates meanings in the metaphysician’s mind. The meaning of the 
term ‘existence’, for example, is not known through the application of 
the Porphyrian tree, but simply by opening one’s eyes and hearing people 
talking to one another. The ‘standard’ meaning of the basic metaphysical 
terms will simply appear in the metaphysician’s mind through the process 
of everyday life.103 This, however, does not entail that the reception of ideas 
from others has, strictly speaking, epistemic value, so Descartes; these 
ideas do not determine what is true and false in a metaphysical theory. 
Only the application of the right method and one’s own reason can do 
that.104 Moreover, as seen, the metaphysician is advised not to take into 
consideration the truth-claims of others when she searches for the truth. 
The details of Descartes’ support of the solitude thesis determine the 
process of teaching and learning in the domain of metaphysics. What 
should be taught is never a collection of metaphysical doctrines, which 
students are expected to ‘choose’ from. Learning metaphysics should 
never be a question of following one or another metaphysical theory. The 
sole subject matter of teaching must be the right method, and even this 
ought to be done in a descriptive mode. But Descartes is confident that 
the properness of his own method will become immediately apparent 
to the attentive student. As soon as the right method is accepted by the 
learner, she will soon find out that she is capable of acquiring complete 
knowledge of the fundamental structure of reality. 
The exposition of Descartes’ solitude thesis that the present paper has 
offered will cause unsettling thoughts to many of its readers. The motto 
‘many people are able to see more than one alone’ represents a belief 
that has permeated our culture and is deeply entrenched in contemporary 
scientific and philosophical practice. Descartes’ case shows that contrary 
to received opinion such a belief is not a sine qua non, a self-evident 
axiom. And if one succeeds in showing that other major philosophers 
have also been fervent supporters of the solitude thesis, one is allowed 
to speak of a thread in the history of Western philosophy that clearly and 
explicitly favors solitude in metaphysical inquiry.
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NOTES   
1   See Bala and Goyal (1998: 597): “More information links can increase the 
probability that a[n] [epistemic] community gets locked into a suboptimal 
option;” Zollman (2011: 338): “In many cases a[n] [epistemic] community 
that withholds information from its members is more reliable than one that 
allows for fully informed individuals;” Zollman (2011: 342): “Communities 
made up of less-informed scientists might well be more reliable indicators 
of the truth than communities that are more connected;” Banerjee (1992: 
798): “[…] Society may actually be better off by constraining some of the 
people to use only their own information;” Banerjee (1992: 811): […] The 
economy may be better off if the early decision makers are not allowed to 
observe the choices made by the other decision makers […]. In other words, 
destroying information (in this limited sense), can be socially beneficial.” All 
additions in brackets, justified by the original context, are mine; this applies 
to the whole paper.
2   This holds for the following works: Cottingham (1986, 2008a, 2008b), 
Kemp-Smith (1953), Williams (1978), Curley (1978), Gaukroger (1980, 
1989, 1995) and Wilson (1978).
3   This, of course, may be so because actually Descartes does not hold such 
a radical view as the solitude thesis; but it may be the case that no one has 
hitherto detected this fact. The present paper aspires to provide compelling 
local evidence in support of the latter possibility.
4   AT VI 31 / CSM I 126 (my emphasis): “I do not know whether I should tell you 
of the first meditations that I had there, for they are perhaps too metaphysical 
[...];” AT VI 38 / CSM I 130 (my emphasis): “[...] Although we have a moral 
certainty about these things, so that it seems we cannot doubt them without 
being extravagant, nevertheless when it is a question of metaphysical 
certainty, we cannot reasonably deny that there are adequate grounds for not 
being entirely sure about them.” See also AT VII 580 and AT VII 574 / CSM II 
387 (my emphasis): “But as long as he merely attacked my views on physics 
or mathematics, I was not too concerned. But in his essay he undertakes to 
subvert the metaphysical principles by means of which I demonstrated the 
existence of God and the real distinction between the human soul and the 
body.”  It is only with respect to metaphysics that Descartes’ method can 
be characterized as purely a priori – this characterization, in other words, 
does not apply to the method in general. When the method has as its subject 
matter empirical knowledge (e.g. the “nature of the magnet” [AT X 427]), 
empirical observations and experiments are elements of its structure. Even 
since the time of the Regulae (1619-1628) Descartes had allowed for “two 
ways of arriving at knowledge of things – through experience and through 
deduction” (AT X 365 / CSM I 12; see also AT X 368; cf. Hatfield (1988)). 
Thus, both Koyré (1939), who describes Descartes’ method as being purely 
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a priori, and Clarke (1982), who describes it as being fully empiricist, are 
off the mark; the Cartesian method, as Alves (2012) correctly points out, is 
flexible (in his words, ‘minimal’), being purely a priori only in metaphysics, 
which is only a part of scientia. Other scholars who, like Alves, have taken 
a via media on the issue of the character of Descartes’ method are Beck 
(1952), Buchdahl (1969), Garber (1978, 1988, 1998), Williams (1978) and 
even Gaugroger (1995: 14). 
5   This variety of foundational knowledge has to do with the fact that for 
Descartes there are many kinds of intuition (a priori, mathematical and 
empirical), which is exactly the element that grounds each and every 
cognition; see AT X 374, 383.  
6   AT VI 8-9, 21, 31. Cf. Garber (1998: 239) and Hatfield (1988: 250-251).
7   This is made clear in the First Meditation in MFP; see AT VII 17-23.
8   It should, however, be noted that the term ‘philosophy’ is sometimes 
identified, not with metaphysics, but rather with the whole of scientia. 
9   AT X 504 / CSM II 404. As AT VI 43 makes clear, Descartes conceives of 
the fundamental determinations of reality as elements that have a presence 
in all possible worlds. 
10   AT VI 63, 65. 
11   AT VI 21 / CSM I 121: “[…] Since I did not restrict the method to any 
particular subject-matter, I hoped to apply it as usefully to the problems of 
the other sciences as I had to those of algebra.”
12   AT VI 2 / CSM I 111: “[...] The power of judging well and of distinguishing 
the true from the false – which is what we what we properly call ‘good sense’ 
or ‘reason’ – is naturally equal in all men, and consequently [...] the diversity 
of our opinions does not arise because some of us are more reasonable than 
others but solely because we direct our thoughts along different paths and 
do not attend to the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind; 
the main thing is to apply it well.”
13   AT VI 2 / CSM I 112.
14   AT VI 2 / CSM I 111, my emphasis.
15   The term ‘knowledge of truth’ is Descartes’; see AT VI 27, 30, 67  and AT 
VII 597. 
16   AT VI 3 / CSM I 112, my emphasis.
17   Zollman (2010) and Zollman (2011).
18   Zollman (2011: 348).
19   Cf. AT X 512, 519-520. For a systematic presentation of the Pyrrhonian 
problematic see Trisokkas (2012: 11-42) and Lammenranta (2008). For an 
evaluation of Descartes’ response to Pyrrhonian scepticism see Westphal 
(1987). 
20   AT VI 8 / CSM I 114-115: “Regarding philosophy, I shall say only [that] [...] 
it has been cultivated for many centuries by the most excellent minds and 
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yet there is still no point in it which is not disputed and hence doubtful [...]. 
And, considering how many diverse opinions learned men may maintain on 
a single question – even though it is impossible for more than one to be true 
– I held as well-nigh false everything that was merely probable.” The retreat 
to the solitary self is also present in the Meditations on First Philosophy – 
there, however, the cause for it is located not so much in Descartes’ personal 
educational experience, but rather in the infamous ‘dreaming argument’ 
and ‘argument from the evil God’ (AT VII 17-23). It is important to note that 
independently of the cause of the retreat, such an act entails the termination 
of the self’s receiving truth-claims from other metaphysicians (at least at the 
beginning of the inquiry).
21   AT VI 4 / CSM I 113; see also AT X 516.
22   AT VI 5 / CSM I 113.
23   The term ‘metaphysical practice’ denotes simply the process of constructing 
a metaphysical theory (i.e. a theory about the fundamental determinations of 
being). Metaphysical practice is the activity of the metaphysician-projector.
24   AT VI 8-9, 21.
25   See especially AT VI 63 / CSM I 143: “[...] By building upon the work of 
our predecessors and combining the lives and labours of many, we might 
make much greater progress [in the science or knowledge of nature] working 
together than anyone could make on his own.” See also AT VI 65 / CSM 
I 144: “[...] The advances I make in the knowledge of nature will depend 
henceforth on the opportunities I get to make more or fewer [...] observations. 
[...] This would oblige all who desire the general well-being of mankind [...] 
both to communicate to me the observations they have already made and 
to assist me in seeking those which remain to be made.” 
26   AT VI 18 / CSM I 120, my emphasis.  
27   This, according to Descartes himself, holds even for the first and the last 
stage: “[...] I take my reasonings to be so closely interconnected that just 
as the last are proved by the first, which are their causes, so the first are 
proved by the last, which are their effects” (AT VI 76 / CSM I 150). See also 
AT X 526-527 / CSM II 419-420: “[...] All truths follow logically from one 
another and are mutually interconnected;” and AT VII 577. This reminds us 
the well-known passage from Hegel’s Science of Logic (WdL I 70 / SL 71): 
“[...] The whole of science [Hegel here means ‘metaphysics’ (I.T.)] forms 
within itself a circle, wherein the first becomes the last and the last the first.” 
28   AT VI 19 / CSM I 120. As Larivière (2009: 483) notes, this feature of the 
Cartesian method was in line with the tradition: “Descartes’s notion of 
science is as deductive as its traditional predecessor. [...] Indeed, the model 
in the Discourse is geometrical or mathematical demonstration: systematic 
deduction from primitively true propositions.”
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29   AT VI 19; AT VI 20-21 / CSM I 121: “[...] beginning with the simplest and 
most general and using each truth I found as a rule for finding further truths 
[...].”
30   Cf. Houlgate (2006: 31): “The path of ‘universal doubt’ that leads into Hegel’s 
science of logic is clearly very similar to that taken by Descartes. Hegel’s 
conclusion, however, is not ‘I think, therefore I am’ but rather ‘thinking, 
therefore is’. From this pure being of thought, Hegel believes, the necessary 
categories of thought have to be derived.” See also Houlgate (2005: 30).
31   AT VI 2.
32   AT VI 21 / CSM I 121.
33   AT VI 9 / CSM I 115, my emphasis. See also AT VI 42 / CSM I 132: “[...] I 
wished to be free to say what I thought about [these matters] without having 
either to follow or to refute the accepted opinions of the learned.”
34   AT VI 9 / CSM I 115.
35   AT VI 11 / CSM I 116, my emphasis.
36   AT VI 31 / CSM I 126, my emphasis.
37   AT VI 11 / CSM I 116.
38   AT VI 11 / CSM I 116; see also AT X 509 / CSM II 407. 
39   AT VI 11 / CSM I 116.
40   AT VI 12 / CSM I 117.
41   AT VI 12 / CSM I 116.
42   AT VI 12 / CSM I 117, my emphasis.
43   AT VI 16/ CSM I 119.
44   AT VI 68 / CSM I 146, my emphasis.
45   Cf. AT VII 578-579.
46   AT VI 68-69 / CSM I 146 (my emphasis); see also AT VII 575 and AT VII 
578 / CSM II 390 (my emphasis): “[…] Their hope is that the truth will be 
discovered, since most of them are convinced that it will eventually emerge 
out of all these debates and arguments. And even if long experience has 
taught them that the truth is rarely discovered in this way, their zeal for the 
truth is such that they think that even the smallest hope of discovering it 
should not be neglected.”
47   AT VI 73 / CSM I 148.
48   AT VI 69 / CSM I 146. 
49   AT VI 72 / CSM I 148.
50   CSM II 399.
51   AT X 495 / CSM II 400.
52   AT X 495 / CSM II 400.
53   AT X 495-496 / CSM II 400.
54   For an attempt to determine what Descartes precisely means with the term 
‘natural light’ see the excellent paper by Morris (1973). Cf. AT VII 598 / 
CSM II 394: “[…] In philosophy I deal only with matters that are known 
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very clearly by natural reason […];” and AT VII 38 / CSM II 27: “Whatever 
is revealed to me by the natural light […] cannot in any way be open to 
doubt.”
55   AT X 523-524.
56   AT X 523-524.
57   AT X 523-524; see also AT X 522 / CSM II 418: “There is no need here for 
a definition, which would confuse rather than clarify the issue.”
58   AT X 523-524 / CSM II 417.
59   AT X 496 / CSM II 400.
60   AT X 497.
61   See the passage below.
62   AT X 496-497 / CSM II 400-401; see also AT VII 579 / CSM II 391: “What has 
perhaps helped me is that I have no great confidence in my own intelligence, 
and so I have followed only those paths that are easy and straightforward. 
It is hardly surprising that, by keeping to such simple routes, a person can 
make more progress than others of greatly superior intelligence, who follow 
rugged and impenetrable pathways.” 
63   See especially AT X 525 / CSM II 419: “It was never my intention to prescribe 
to anyone the method which he should follow in his search for truth, but 
simply to describe the method which I used myself: if it should be thought 
to be defective, it would be rejected; if good and useful, others would use 
it too.” See also AT VI 4.
64   AT X 497 / CSM II 401.
65   See Brockliss (1995: 5): “[…] Early seventeenth-century professors of 
philosophy were […] concerned first of all about the mechanics of organizing 
and relaying an authoritative body of knowledge.” See the whole paper for 
further discussion.
66   AT X 497-498 / CSM II 401.
67   AT X 498 / CSM II 401.
68   AT X 498 / CSM II 401.
69   AT X 497 / CSM II 401.
70   AT X 499 / CSM II 401.
71   AT X 499 / CSM II 402.
72   AT X 499 / CSM II 401.
73   AT X 498 / CSM II 401.
74   AT X 500 / CSM II 401.
75   AT X 501 / CSM II 402.
76   AT X 501 / CSM II 402.
77   AT X 501 / CSM II 403. 
78   AT X 500 / CSM II 402.
79   AT X 502 / CSM II 403.
80   AT X 503 / CSM II 404.
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81   AT X 503 / CSM II 404.
82   AT X 504 / CSM II 404; see also AT X 510.
83   AT X 504 / CSM II 404; see also AT X 515 / CSM II 409: “[…] From this 
universal doubt, as from a fixed and immovable point, I propose to derive 
the knowledge of God, of yourself, and of everything in the universe.” 
84   AT X 503-504.
85   AT X 506 / CSM II 405.
86   AT X 506 / CSM II 405.
87   AT X 507-508 / CSM II 406.
88   AT X 508 / CSM II 406.
89   Plato, Meno 82a-86a. The ‘slave-experiment’ is Plato’s proof of his claim 
that all mathematical and metaphysical knowledge is recollection. Descartes 
comes very close to Plato’s view on AT VII 64 / MFP 44: “And the truth of 
these matters is so open and so much in harmony with my nature, that on 
first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something 
new as remembering what I knew before […].” 
90   AT X 518 / CSM II 412. 
91   AT X 519 / CSM II 413.
92   AT X 521 / CSM II 415.
93   AT VII 17 / CSM II 12.
94   AT VII 18.
95   This is made particularly clear by the conclusion of ‘the wax example’(AT 
VII 31 / CSM II 21): “I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece of 
wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind 
alone. […] The perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or 
imagination – nor has it ever been, despite previous appearances – but of 
purely mental scrutiny […];” see also AT VII 34 / CSM II 22: “I now know 
that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of 
imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not 
from their being touched or seen but from their being understood […].” For 
more items on the list see AT VII 43, 45, 65.
96   AT VII 67.
97   AT VII 34 / CSM II 24; see also AT VI 56 / CSM II 39: “Next, when I look 
more closely into myself […].”
98   AT VII 47 / CSM II 32. See also: AT VII 42 / CSM II 29: “The longer and 
more carefully I examine these points, the more clearly and distinctly I 
recognize their truth;” AT VII 55 / CSM II 38: “As I reflect on these matters 
more attentively, […];” AT VII 68 / CSM II 47: “Some of the things I clearly 
and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered 
only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully […].” 
On this process of personal reflection as a process of justification see the 
brilliant essay by Beyssade (2008).
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99   Even the scholastic distinction between the objective and the formal reality 
of ideas, which Descartes makes use of in the Third Meditation, does not 
signal the presence of the Other; this is so because Descartes explains 
the distinction fully and simply and in the context of his current personal 
discussion (‘meditation’) alone. Moreover, Descartes explicitly declares that 
the distinction “is manifest by the natural light” (AT VII 40 / CSM II 28). In 
other words, a man of moderate intelligence could discover the distinction 
purely by himself, without heeding the words of an Other. The same holds 
for the other principles that Descartes employs in his argument, such as the 
principle that “something cannot arise from nothing” (AT VII 40 / CSM II 
28) and the principle that “what is more perfect cannot arise from what is 
less perfect” (AT VII 40-41 / CSM II 28), both of which are “transparently 
true” (AT VII 41 / CSM II 28) and “clear to me by the natural light” (AT VII 
42 / CSM II 29).   
100 AT VII 35 / CSM II 24 (my emphasis); see also AT VII 70 / CSM II 48 
(my emphasis): “[…] I am incapable of error in those cases where my 
understanding is transparently clear.”
101 Glouberman (2011: 877).
102 AT X 515 / CSM II 409. It is sometimes the case that in his replies to his 
contemporaries’ comments on his metaphysics or in his letters to prominent 
figures of his time Descartes explicitly asks for their critical opinion and 
advice – an attitude that does not square with the demands of the solitude 
thesis. Nevertheless, in all these cases the continuation of Descartes’ prose 
makes it clear that he makes such a statement only out of courtesy. Take, 
for example, the Letter to Father Dinet. Descartes begins by making a 
statement that obviously undermines the solitude thesis (AT VII 564 / CSM II 
384: “[…] My dearest wish is to test the certainty of my opinions by having 
them examined by distinguished men, in the hope that they will be unable 
to discover any element of falsity in them; and failing that, my next wish 
is to be advised of my mistakes so that I can put them right.” But he then 
goes on to make claims that unambiguously contradict this statement. He 
tells us that his metaphysical arguments in DM “possessed incontrovertible 
certainty” (AT VII 575 / CSM II 388), that the publication of his philosophy 
signals the uncovering of truth (AT VII 575 / CSM II 388), that “although 
many people have […] tried to refute [his writings] by every possible means, 
no one […] has been able to find in them anything that is not true” (AT 
VII 579 / CSM II 391), that he proved that his metaphysical beliefs are true 
(AT VII 582 / CSM II 392), that it is clearly perceived that his metaphysical 
beliefs are true (AT VII 582 / CSM II 392) and, finally, that “if [he] were to 
be frank,” he has no doubts about the truth of his metaphysics (AT VII 603 
/ CSM II 397).     
103 Descartes believed that the basic concepts of metaphysics are “naturally 
implanted in the human mind” (AT VII 580 / CSM II 392), that they are 
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“innate” (AT VII 37 / MFP 26, AT VII 51 / MFP 35); cf. Voltaire (1733: 63): 
“[Descartes] maintained […] that the soul comes into the body already 
endowed with all the metaphysical notions, knowing God, space, the infinite, 
having every abstract idea, in short full of learning, which it unfortunately 
forgets on leaving its mother’s womb.”
104  See AT VI 77 / CSM I 150: “I do not boast of being the first to discover [these 
ideas], but I do claim to have accepted them not because they have, or have 
not, been expressed by others, but solely because reason has convinced me 
of them.”
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